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Abstract  
The regulation of assisted reproductive technologies is a contested area. Some jurisdictions, 
such as the UK and a number of Australian states, have comprehensive regulation of most 
aspects of assisted reproductive technologies; others, such as the USA, have taken a more 
piecemeal approach and rely on professional guidelines and the general regulation of medical 
practice to govern this area. It will be argued that such a laissez-faire approach is inadequate 
for regulating the complex area of assisted reproductive technologies. Two key examples, 
reducing multiple births and registers of donors and offspring, will be considered to illustrate 
the effects of the regulatory structure of assisted reproductive technologies in the USA on 
practice. It will be concluded that the regulatory structure in the USA fails to provide an 
adequate mechanism for ensuring the ethical and safe conduct of ART services, and 
that more comprehensive regulation is required. 
 
KEYWORDS: American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), assisted reproductive 
technologies, infertility treatment, legislation, policy, regulation 
 
Introduction 
 
The regulation of assisted reproductive technologies is a contested area. Some jurisdictions, 
such as the UK and a number of Australian states, have comprehensive regulation of most 
aspects of assisted reproductive technologies; others, such as the USA, have taken a more 
piecemeal approach and rely on professional guidelines and the general regulation of medical 
practice to govern this area (Ory et al., 2013). In this paper, we argue that such a laissez-faire 
approach is inadequate for regulating the complex area of assisted reproductive technologies, 
and conclude that more comprehensive regulation is required. The aim of this paper is to give 
a perspective on regulation of assisted reproductive technologies in the USA and compare it 
with other jurisdictions with very different regulatory systems and approaches to government 
intervention, drawing heavily on examples from the UK. The purpose here is not to argue that 
the solutions and approaches to regulation adopted in other countries, particularly the UK, 
could be applicable to the USA. We recognize that the American socio-political context in 
which assisted reproductive technologies operate, attitudes towards government intervention, 
particularly at federal level, and the funding structure of US health care means that national 
legislation on assisted reproductive technologies, such as exists in the UK, is highly unlikely 
to be either practical or ideologically acceptable to most stakeholders in the USA. Our 
purpose is merely to open up the discussion by using examples of radically different 
regulatory systems, with a view to finding compromises between regulatory oversight and the 
autonomy and privacy of practitioners and users that would be acceptable in the USA. 
Regulatory structures and provisions are not set in stone, and the lively debate in the UK over 
the Government’s plans to abolish the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA), with strong arguments on either side (Johnson, 2013), show that these matters are 
never completely resolved even by comprehensive legislation. 
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Background 
 
In the USA, forms of assisted reproductive technology regulation exist at federal and state 
level. At federal level, assisted reproductive technologies are overseen by the Fertility 
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act 1992, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. Medical practice is also regulated at individual state level. This can include specific 
regulations on assisted reproductive technologies (in the main relating to insurance coverage). 
Considerable inter-state variation, however, exists; some states have limited or non-existent 
regulation and others have more comprehensive oversight. Because of the relative lack of 
legal regulation at both these levels, professional guidelines and good practice protocols play 
an important role in overseeing assisted reproductive technology practice. The American 
Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and its affiliate, the Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (SART), offer professional self-regulation through guidelines and 
codes of conduct for fertility clinics and their staff. Key among these are the ASRM Ethics 
Committee Reports and Practice Committee opinions (ASRM and SART Practice 
Committee, 2013; ASRM Ethics Committee, 2004). The ASRM has consistently asserted 
that, owing to the existence of this framework assisted reproductive technologies are 
sufficiently well regulated and there is little need for further intervention (Adamson, 2005; 
Rebar and DeCherney, 2004). Following a meeting to review the oversight of assisted 
reproductive technologies, the ASRM produced a report in May 2010 re-stating this position 
that assisted reproductive technologies are, ‘one of most highly regulated of all medical 
practices in the United States’ (ASRM, 2010). We do not necessarily quarrel with that view 
in this paper, as our purpose is not to examine or compare different regulatory regimes of 
other areas of medical practice in the USA. The aim is to highlight important omissions in the 
regulatory structures that govern assisted reproductive technologies in the USA, and to argue 
that the oversight of assisted reproductive technologies is much less extensive and rigorous 
than the ASRM claims. Before considering the specifics of US regulation, it is useful to 
consider what is meant by ‘sufficiently well-regulated’. We argue that assisted reproductive 
technologies are sufficiently well regulated if regulations, which are designed to promote the 
safe and ethical conduct of these practices, are present and enforceable in some meaningful 
way and have broad support of all the relevant stakeholders. 
 
Limitations of regulation 
 
At the federal level, the sole statute regulating assisted conception, the Wyden Law (the 
colloquial term for the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act) is limited in scope. 
It is primarily designed to make publicly available accurate information about fertility clinic 
success rates by requiring annual data reporting to the CDC. It has been commented, 
however, that this publically available outcome data can be misleading, and a small number 
of clinics have reported data in such a way as to give an inflated picture of their pregnancy 
rates. For example, the analysis by Kushnir et al. (2013) of SART and CDC reporting data 
showed that some centres were excluding cycles started in women over the age of 38 
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years. By doing this, these clinics reported significantly better pregnancy rates than average 
and were able to increase their market share by 19.9%. Kushnir et al. (2013) conclude that 
future data collection and reporting need to be more patient-centred so that success rates of 
clinics can be more accurately and fairly compared. The HFEA, for example, organized 
a public consultation on how clinic success rates should be reported, to allow patients to 
make the most informed choices when selecting a clinic (HFEA, 2008). The outcomes of this 
are reflected on the HFEA’s website where information is presented in an accessible way to 
help people understand the meaning of the statistics used in making clinic comparisons 
and aid them in making treatment choices (HFEA, 2014). In the USA, such comprehensive 
data do not exist on clinics, not all of them file reports to CDC, and each year about 12% of 
them fail to do so. In 2009, 43 clinics did not report (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2011), in 2010, 31 clinics failed to reported (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2012) and, in 2011 (the latest figures available), 30 clinics failed to report 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Data from clinics are also collected by 
SART on a voluntary basis, and these are shared with the CDC. Not all clinics report to 
SART either; of those that did, 113 (28.1%) did not report a complete data set (Kushnir et al., 
2013). Further, it is unclear if every practising fertility clinic is known to the CDC and 
therefore included in these figures, as they state: ‘We will continue to make every effort to 
include in future reports all clinics and practitioners providing ART (assisted reproductive 
technologies) services.’ (CDC Website, commonly asked questions reference). Furthermore, 
the CDC request any customer who is aware of a fertility clinic that is operating but not 
included in their list of assisted reproductive technology centres to notify them. In addition to 
this lack of reporting, the data that the CDC requires clinics to collect are more limited than 
data provided by clinics in the UK to the HFEA and in Australia and New Zealand to the 
Australian and New Zealand Assisted Reproduction Database (Macaldowie et al., 2012), for 
example. A key area in which data collected by the CDC are limited is information on the use 
of donor gametes. The CDC only collect data on the use of donor eggs and do not collect data 
on donor sperm (i.e. how many treatments are conducted with donor sperm and success 
rates): ‘Some ART procedures use a woman’s own eggs, and others use donated eggs or 
embryos. Although sperm used to create an embryo may also be either from a woman’s 
partner or from a sperm donor, information in the report is presented according to the egg 
source.’ (CDC, Web Tutorial) The CDC only collect data on the age of egg donors and on the 
use of donor eggs, covering areas such as: are older women undergoing assisted reproductive 
technologies more likely to use donor eggs or embryos? Do percentages of transfers that 
result in live births differ by age for women who used assisted reproductive technologies with 
donor eggs compared with women who used assisted reproductive technologies with their 
own eggs? How successful is assisted reproductive technology when donor eggs are used? 
(CDC, Web Tutorial). National records of the numbers of gamete donors, to whom they 
donated, and medical information are not, however, required by the CDC. This makes it 
impossible to track gamete donor trends in the USA or determine how many times an 
individual donor might be used. 
 
The Wyden Law also provides States with a model embryology laboratory certification 
process. It is not mandatory to implement such a model, and embryology laboratories are not 
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required to have this type of certification because the procedures they perform are not 
deemed to be diagnostic and therefore do not fall within the remit of the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Act under which compliance is mandatory. The FDA’s role in overseeing 
assisted reproductive technologies also has significant limitations. The FDA has jurisdiction 
over setting standards for screening and testing donors of all forms of human tissue and 
tissue-based products under Regulation 21 code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1271 
(Food and Drug Administration, 2004). These regulations were primarily designed to prevent 
communicable diseases. The storage and use of reproductive tissue, however, raise distinctive 
issues that are not covered by these regulations. For instance, they do not incorporate 
guidance on genetic testing of prospective donors, and this has resulted in wide variation in 
the practices of sperm donor banks. This was highlighted 14 years ago (Conrad et al., 1996); 
more recently, Sims et al. (2010) found that routine testing for genetic diseases varied 
substantially between sperm banks, with different conditions being screened for and a wide 
range of tests used. Isley and Callum (2013) found similar variability of practice in their 
study, which included information from 13 out of 26 sperm banks in the USA. This study 
reported that, although these banks voluntarily followed the testing guidelines from at least 
one professional organization (such as the ASRM and the American Association of Tissue 
Banks), the lack of consistency between banks is still an issue. Similar inconsistencies in 
practice have been observed in the screening of oocyte donors. Lewis et al. (1999) 
investigated compliance with ASRM guidelines by 159 oocyte donation programmes, and 
concluded that, although: ‘most programmes follow recommendations made by the . . . 
ASRM for screening of gamete donors . . . a significant percentage do not use well-
established testing.’ A 2011 study of 16 oocyte donation agencies and 28 assisted 
reproductive technologies clinics (out of 59 agencies and 205 clinics invited to take part) 
concluded that these programmes inconsistently applied genetic screening guidelines from 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American College of Medical 
Genetics, and ASRM (Lim et al., 2011). These wide variations in practice have resulted in 
unacceptable variations in practice and insufficiently robust genetic screening of donor 
gametes (Heled, 2010). Furthermore, reproductive tissue is not included in all of the 21 CFR 
Part 1271 regulations (Food and Drug Administration, 2004). Only small sections of the 
Good Tissue Practice regulations, for example, apply to most reproductive establishments 
(Keel and Schalue, 2010). The FDA itself points out that it is unclear if all facilities that 
handle reproductive tissue comply with accepted industry standards: 
 
Facilities handling reproductive tissue. . . . represent the greatest area of uncertainty. 
. . . There is currently no single reliable source of information on fertility center or 
semen bank adherence to AATB [American Association of Tissue Banks]  standards or 
ASRM guidelines. (Food and Drug Administration, 2004). 
 
In summary, weaknesses in the federal regulatory structure of assisted reproductive 
technologies have resulted in inconsistencies in practice and areas that are insufficiently 
regulated.  
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Individual states also have the power to pass legislation governing assisted reproductive 
technologies; however, many states have not legislated in this area. A report published by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures in 2007 (that has not subsequently been updated) 
indicates that legislation on embryo and gamete disposition (covering key areas such as legal 
parenthood of children conceived from donated gametes and consent procedures for use and 
storage of gametes) has only been enacted in 16 states (The National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2007b). Laws relating to health insurance coverage for infertility treatments also 
vary between states (Martin et al., 2011. The National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2012). On the regulation of techniques related to standard IVF, such as cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research, only 15 states have legislation relating to human cloning, and, 
within these laws what is covered and prohibited varies (The National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2008). More states have legislation governing the use of embryonic stem cells 
in research, but approaches differ greatly from state to state: some states, such as California 
and Illinois, allow this kind of research and have guidelines for consent processes and 
reviews procedures for projects; others, such as South Dakota, prohibit research on embryos 
(The National Conference of State Legislatures, 2007a). Thirteen states do not have any 
legislation on assisted reproductive technologies provision, and many only have limited 
legislative cover (Table 1). Naomi Cahn in her book Test tube families: why the fertility 
market needs legal regulation (Cahn, 2009) discusses some of the problems with piecemeal 
state legislation in this area, such as conflicting state laws that govern surrogacy, lack of clear 
legal regulation in some states over who is the legal parent of children produced from gamete, 
embryo donation, or both, which creates particular uncertainty for same-sex couples and 
single women over who has parental rights. This evidence suggests that state oversight of 
assisted reproductive technologies is incomplete and patchy, leaving the population in some 
areas with little state level regulation of key areas of assisted reproductive technologies. One 
argument to be made is that local areas should be able to legislate for local need and in 
accordance with local values; therefore, this state-wide variation is not, in itself, problematic. 
Assisted reproductive technologies, however, are medical treatments that operate across state 
and national borders, and people will travel out of state if better treatment options are 
available. About 16% of assisted reproductive technologies cycles in the USA in 2009 were 
performed on out-of-state residents (Sunderam et al., 2012). This is an issue that affects all 
countries, and is just as much a problem within Europe. Individuals can always travel to 
different jurisdictions to access treatments that are not available locally (either due to 
resources or regulatory prohibition) and, therefore, to a degree, even national legislation can 
become piecemeal in a global context (Gürtin and Inhorn, 2011). In a country the size of the 
USA, however, national consistency would be a desirable end. The final area of oversight of 
assisted reproductive technologies is through professional regulation. A major plank 
in this regulation, the ASRM and SART professional codes and guidelines, are essentially 
voluntarily recommending, rather than enforcing, good practice. Membership of SART 
guarantees certain standards of practice (following ASRM guidelines, reporting to the CDC, 
accredited embryology laboratories and staff training standards, for example), but if 
membership is rescinded owing to non-compliance, clinics may still operate. As mentioned 
previously, not all clinics report to the CDC. Therefore, a clinic’s failure to submit an annual 
report to CDC does not seem to adversely affect its ability to continue to offer services. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Consequences of regulatory structure: examples from practice 
 
To illustrate the limitations of the regulatory model in the USA, we will take two examples 
from practice, reducing multiple births and registers of gamete donors and offspring, to show 
how the piecemeal and voluntary regulatory structure of assisted reproductive technologies in 
the USA provides an inadequate mechanism for ensuring the ethical and safe conduct of 
assisted reproductive technology services. 
 
Multiple births 
 
It is widely acknowledged that multiple pregnancies represent the most significant health 
problem associated with assisted reproductive technology for both mothers and babies (Rebar 
and DeCherney, 2004). This is a phenomenon largely attributable to the number of embryos 
transferred in a single IVF cycle. The ASRM first issued guidelines proposing limits on the 
numbers of transferred embryos in 1999 (ASRM, 1999), recommending the transfer of no 
more than three embryos for women aged under 35 years, no more than four for women aged 
35–40 years, and no more than five for women aged over 40 years. Following several 
revisions, the most recent guidance issued in 2013 (ASRM, 2013) recommends that, for 
women aged under 35 years, consideration should be given to transferring one embryo and no 
more than two (although the effects of this latest guidance will not be apparent for a number 
of years). The practice of member clinics is also monitored by SART, and an onsite 
inspection would be triggered if unwarranted deviation from the national mean of multiple 
births is evident. 
 
The ASRM argues that an 80% decrease in the number of triplet births between 1999 and 
2007 demonstrates the success of this ‘self-policing’ (ASRM, 2010). Writing over 14 years 
ago, Jones and Schnorr (2001) argued that: ‘It seems clear that the voluntary guideline system 
in the United States has not solved the problem of multiple gestations,’ and we see little 
evidence that the situation has improved significantly since then. In 2006, transfer of three or 
more embryos was still common practice in the USA (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009). In a detailed analysis of the 2009 surveillance data conducted by the CDC 
in 2012, Sunderam et al. (2012) conclude that more than one embryo was transferred in most 
IVF cycles for all age groups. The national average for embryos transferred was 2.1 among 
women aged 35 years and under and 2.5 for women aged 35–40 years. As a result, about 32% 
of assisted reproductive technologies infants born in 2009 were pre-term, compared with 
about 8% of pre-term births in the general US population, and 47% were born in multiple-
birth deliveries, compared with 3% in the general US population. The twin rate was 43.7%, 
compared with 3.3% in the general US population, and the rate of triplets and higher-order 
multiples was 3.6%, about 25 times higher than the general US population rate. Babies born 
from assisted reproductive technologies contributed to 34.4% of all triplets or higher order 
multiple births in the population, but only 1.4% of all infants born in the USA were 
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conceived using ART. The authors conclude: ‘More than one embryo was transferred per 
procedure in most states and territories for all age groups, influencing the overall multiple 
birth rates in the United States’ (Sunderam et al., 2012). One study found that at least one-
half of the clinicians surveyed would deviate from ASRM embryo transfer number guidelines 
in certain situations (Jungheim et al., 2010) Hence, it is clear that not all clinics are following 
the ASRM guidelines, and single embryo transfer (SET) is still not a common treatment 
option. 
 
Reductions in the number of embryos transferred have been much slower in the USA 
compared with European countries, where external constraints and regulation have been more 
stringent (Gleicher et al., 2007). In the UK, for example, policies on the number of embryos 
that should be transferred were introduced in the form of national, legally enforceable rules 
(although in a specific case whether the HFEA can make such a reduction a condition of the 
clinic’s licence has been challenged on procedural grounds (England and Wales High Court, 
2013)). In 2001, the HFEA, introduced a two-embryo transfer policy for women under the 
age of 40 years, and only allowed three embryos to be transferred in exceptional 
circumstances. In 2004, this policy was revised so that a maximum of two embryos could be 
transferred to women under the age of 40 years, and a maximum of three embryos could be 
transferred in women aged 40 years and over. These policies have had an important effect on 
the triplet rate. By 2007, the triplet rate was 1 in 4975 births, compared with its peak of 1 in 
2130 births in 1998 (HEFA, 2013c). In 2009, the HFEA implemented a policy that required 
clinics to have a ‘multiple pregnancy minimisation strategy’ to increase the numbers of SET, 
and clinics have to meet targets for reducing their numbers of multiple births. Following the 
introduction of this policy, the numbers of elective SET have risen: in 2008, 4.8% of embryo 
transfers were elective SET, whereas, in 2011, 16.8% were elective SET. Consequently, the 
multiple pregnancy rate has fallen from 26.6% in 2008 to 20.1% in 2011 (HFEA, 2013a). 
Belgium also introduced a legal restriction on the numbers of embryos that could be 
transferred in 2003 (alongside reimbursement of laboratory costs), and this has resulted in a 
reduction in the multiple pregnancy rate from 27 to 11% (De Neubourg et al., 2013). 
Concerns have also been expressed over these type of policies (Gleicher, 2011), namely that 
they could adversely affect pregnancy rates. The most recent figures published by the HFEA, 
however, do not support this, and the pregnancy rate increased from 2008–2009, and 
remained steady in the early part of 2010 (HFEA, 2013a). 
 
Centrally imposed elective SET levels are not the only way of reducing the multiple birth 
rate. Chambers et al. (2013) compared the UK’s regulatory structure with Australia that has a 
multiple birth rate less than one-half that of the UK at 8%, and argue that a higher level of 
public funding for assisted reproductive technologies in Australia (meaning that patients are 
more likely to accept elective SET), a lighter regulatory touch and lack of clinic league tables 
has driven up the elective SET rate (to 70% of cycles compared with 31% in the UK). 
Chambers et al. (2013) have commented that the financial context of infertility treatment has 
a substantial effect on the acceptability of elective SET to patients, ‘presumably because 
more affordable treatment reduces the financial incentive to achieve pregnancy in the shortest 
number of treatment cycles.’ In the USA, with the variability of insurance coverage for 
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infertility treatment, the resulting high cost may encourage particular practices, such as 
transferring more embryos (Hamilton and McManus, 2012). These authors found that 
insurance mandates (i.e. insurance coverage) for infertility treatment not only increased 
access but also led to the transferring fewer embryos. Hence, in the USA, such centrally 
imposed regulation might be an appropriate option in light of the funding structure of 
treatment with varying insurance coverage for assisted reproductive technologies. 
 
Donor registries 
 
A further example of difficulties raised by the absence of comprehensive legislation in the 
USA is the lack of any national registry of those who have used assisted reproductive 
technologies with donor gametes, embryos, or both, and those born from these techniques. As 
discussed above, the CDC does not require such information to be collected or collated 
nationally. A nationally mandated donor registry would enable the collection and storage of 
information on the donor, such as how many times they had donated, family medical history, 
recipients of the donation and details of the outcome of the donation. The ASRM and SART 
have objected to the establishment of both state and national donor registries in the USA 
(ASRM Office of Public Affairs, 2012), and criticised a bill proposed in New York, AB 
9039/SB 6272 that would limit to 10 the number of offspring any one donor can conceive and 
create a donor registry in the state. The ASRM argued that scientific evidence does not 
support the limit of 10, and referenced existing professional guidelines, while maintaining 
that a single state-based registry would not only be ineffective, but also intrusive (ASRM 
Office of Public Affairs, 2012). Despite objections, a number of arguments exist for a 
national registry. First, such a registry would also allow research into ARTs to track long-
term trends and follow up that can be used to increase the safety of the procedures (Basu, 
2004; Cahn, 2008; D’Orazio, 2006; Sylvester and Burt, 2007). Second, the establishment of 
donor registries could be used to formulate appropriate limits on the use of donors, as 
currently without adequate records of how many times a donor is used it is not possible to 
provide scientific evidence to establish any evidence-based limits and develop robust 
guidelines for practice (Sawyer, 2009). Finally, a national registry could facilitate information 
exchange. If a system was introduced where donors were required to agree to the disclosure 
of their identity to any offspring (as it has been introduced, in part, in Washington 
(Washington, 2011), then accurate records would be available to facilitate the linking of 
donors and donor offspring. Although such legislation is unlikely to be retrospective, in the 
UK those who donated before anonymity was abolished in 2005 can voluntarily apply to the 
HFEA to re-register as non-anonymous donors. This allows any offspring who might want to 
find out the identity of their donor to access this information if their donor has taken up this 
option. This reregistration would not be possible without the national records kept by the 
HFEA. This presupposes that non-anonymity is deemed to be a desirable way of organising 
gamete donation. There has been great debate over this, and it is argued that it is unethical to 
practice gamete donation under conditions of anonymity (Allen, 2012; Tobin, 2012). 
Therefore, for some commentators, the existence of a national register could facilitate a more 
ethical approach to gamete donation. The Practice Committee of the ASRM and SART 
(2013) have recently issued recommendations for clinics and sperm banks to establish 
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permanent records of donor recruitment and follow-up evaluations. Although this would 
provide some much needed information on donor use and allow some linkage in the event of 
reported adverse outcomes for donors or offspring, this proposal falls short of establishing a 
national registry and achieving the benefits that would accrue from this. 
 
Discussion 
 
Although the ASRM claim that assisted reproductive technologies are adequately regulated, 
there is clearly room for greater non-voluntary regulation of this area. A number of 
objections, however, could be made to these suggestions for increased regulation. First, it has 
been debated whether such extended legislation, particularly at federal level, would be 
constitutional. Jones and Schnorr (2001) say that there seems to be a constitutional 
requirement that such legislation be enacted at state level. Heled (2010), however, argues that 
federal legislation is not prima facie ruled out by constitutional requirements. Whether 
legislation on assisted reproductive technologies at federal level would fall foul of the 
constitution would depend on the detail and scope of the proposals. The Supreme Court 
recognizes that the federal government can set national health and safety standards (Heled, 
2010), and therefore such a possibility of greater federal regulation of assisted reproductive 
technologies cannot be automatically ruled out. Second, the legal and political framework in 
the USA puts a high premium on privacy (Spar, 2005), and establishing a national registry 
that could track gamete donors and their use could be seen as an infringement of individuals’ 
reproductive privacy (Cohen, 2012). As Spar (2005) notes, state legislation has traditionally 
exerted authority over reproduction in areas such as contraception and abortion, although 
there is greater distrust of federal level intervention. However, national data are already 
collected by federal bodies, the CDC for example. We would argue that, in the case of 
assisted reproductive technologies, there is value in establishing such a register, and privacy 
concerns could be addressed by ensuring that the information was adequately safeguarded. It 
is worth noting that, despite being in existence for a number of years, there has never been 
any suggestion that the security of data held in such registers in the UK or in Australian states 
has ever been compromised. Finally, the cost of such increased regulation might be seen as a 
barrier. In the UK, the HFEA is funded by a combination of government (Department of 
Health) funding, about £1.3m per annum, and fees levied on the clinics (HFEA, 2012/13). 
Currently, clinics are charged £75 for each cycle of IVF they perform and £37.50 for donor 
insemination with a discount for elective SET (clinics are charged £75 for the first elective 
SET, after which no charge is made for all subsequent transfers (subject to a small number of 
exceptions). For every frozen embryo transfer that is not an elective SET, clinics are charged 
£75 (HFEA, 2013b). Most of the HFEA’s costs are met by clinics paying this levy. In 2012–
2013, fee income to the HFEA was £3,978,594, with a £778,476 grant from the Department 
of Health (HFEA, 2012/13). It is important to note that most fertility treatment in the UK is 
carried out privately (40.3% of IVF treatment was funded by the National Health Service and 
59.7% funded privately; with only 17.9% of donor insemination cycles funded by the 
National Health Service (HFEA, 2013a)) and the cost per cycle is passed on to the consumer 
either as a specific item on the bill or as part of the general treatment fee. Therefore, in 
certain respects, the assisted reproductive technology treatment context in the UK and the 
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USA are not as dissimilar as they are for other forms of medicine where, with certain 
exceptions, the bulk is publically funded in the UK. Any increase in regulation in the USA 
would incur some financial cost (both to the clinics and to the federal government), raising 
the cost of treatment, and there would need to be some federal commitment to providing 
funds to support such a national endeavour. We would argue, however, that this cost would 
be a small one, and the benefits of a well regulated and safe provision of assisted 
reproductive technologies would outweigh this. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that existing regulations do not sufficiently regulate assisted 
reproductive technologies in the USA, as enforceable measures to promote the safe and 
ethical practice of assisted reproductive technologies is lacking. There have been suggestions 
within US-fertility circles for how increased regulation might be achieved. Howard W. Jones 
Jr., a revered figure both in the USA and internationally, together with John Schnorr, argued 
that one solution would be to create an agency at ‘arms length’ from government – modelled 
on the then Voluntary Licensing Authority in the UK – the precursor to the HFEA. Such a 
body could, in their view, accomplish more effective regulation without government 
interference (Jones and Schnorr, 2001). They suggested that the National Advisory Board for 
Ethics in Reproduction, established in 1991 by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists and the American Fertility Society, could have taken on this role. When this 
was mooted in the mid-1990s, however, support from practitioners and politically for such a 
body to be established was lacking and for the NABER to take on this role (Kalfoglou, 
2000). The ASRM considered and then dismissed the suggestion to introduce a: ‘medical 
practice act requiring specialists in ART to follow ASRM guidelines,’ on the grounds that the 
area is already sufficiently regulated (ASRM, 2010). While we recognise that a body like the 
HFEA or prescriptive national legislation would find little favour in the USA, some form of 
greater regulation is needed. Greater regulation could ensure that clinics follow ASRM 
guidelines, comply with federal reporting and certification requirements, and would go some 
way to ensuring uniformity of practice and maintenance of minimum standards. Greater 
regulation would also enable better data reporting, ensuring that success rates are more 
accurately reported and reflect the differences between different patient groups, and a 
national registry would aid information and data exchange. Any regulatory structure, 
however, needs to have teeth, and if it is left as a voluntary measure there will always be 
those who do not comply. 
 
 
Table 1 State regulation of assisted reproductive technologies in the USA 
 
State Gamete donation 
disposition17 
Human 
cloning16 
Stem cell 
research 
20 
Insurance 
19 
Alabama     
Alaska     
11 
 
Arizona  √ √  
Arkansas  √ √ √ 
California √ √ √ √ 
Colorado √    
Connecticut √ √ √ √ 
Delaware     
Florida √  √  
Georgia     
Hawaii    √ 
Idaho     
Illinois   √ √ 
Indiana  √ √  
Iowa  √ √  
Kansas     
Kentucky   √  
Louisiana √  √ √ 
Maine   √  
Maryland √ √ √ √ 
Massachusetts √ √ √ √ 
Michigan  √ √  
Minnesota   √ √ 
Mississippi     
Missouri  √ √  
Montana   √ √ 
Nebraska   √  
Nevada     
New 
Hampshire 
  √  
New Jersey √ √ √ √ 
New Mexico   √  
New York √  √ √ 
North Carolina     
North Dakota √ √ √  
Ohio   √ √ 
Oklahoma √  √  
Oregon     
Pennsylvania   √  
Rhode Island  √ √ √ 
South Carolina     
South Dakota  √ √  
Tennessee   √  
Texas √  √ √ 
Utah   √  
Vermont     
Virginia √ √ √  
Washington √    
West Virginia    √ 
Wisconsin     
12 
 
Wyoming √  √  
 
Source: The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The data used for this table 
are taken from the NCSL and, in some cases, have not been updated recently. Hence, these 
data should be seen as illustrative and not as providing a comprehensive overview of all the 
legislation in this area across US states. For further details see Appendix S1. 
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Supplementary Material (to be made available online) 
 
Table S1: Embryo and gamete disposition laws in the USA 
Updated July 2007 
State Statutes 
California California Penal Code §367g prohibits the use spermatoza, ova, or embryos in assisted 
reproduction technology in a manner other than stated on the written consent form of the 
provider of the spermatoza, ova or embryos. The statute also requires signed written consent to 
implant embryos or gametes. The use of sperm donated to a licensed tissue bank is excluded. 
California Health and Safety Codes §125315 requires healthcare providers to give infertility 
patients the necessary information to make an informed and voluntary choice about the 
disposition of any human embryos remaining after fertility treatment. Patients must receive a 
form that sets forth advance directives for the disposition of frozen embryos. Patients must be 
offered several options, including storing any unused embryos, donating them to another 
individual, discarding the embryos, or donating the remaining embryos for research. The State 
Department of Health Services must establish and maintain a registry of embryos that would 
provide researchers with access to embryos for research purposes. The law specifies 
requirements for obtaining informed consent from an individual considering donating embryos 
for research.  California Probate Code §249.5 to 249.8 states that a child conceived and born 
after the death of a parent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of the deceased 
parent as long as the deceased parent consented to the use of the genetic material or the child 
was in utero within 2 years of the decedent’s death. If the child meets one of these 
qualifications, he or she will be entitled to death benefits from that parent. 
 
2006 Cal. Stats., Chap. 483 requires a physician and surgeon, before obtaining informed 
consent from an individual for assisted oocyte production or other method of retrieving eggs 
from the ovaries for research or medical treatments, to provide the individual with a 
standardized written summary of health and consumer issues, and to obtain written and oral 
informed consent.  It prohibits human oocytes or embryos from being acquired, sold, offered 
for sale, or otherwise transferred for valuable consideration for medical research or therapies. 
 
2006 Cal. Stats., Chap. 806 requires a person who causes conception through assisted 
reproduction to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of California.  It permits a person who 
enters an assisted reproduction agreement to bring an action to establish a parent and child 
relationship. It permits the court to enter an order or judgement based on that action before the 
birth of the child and to consider a parent's criminal record before the felony conviction in 
making a finding that a parent is unfit to have future custody or control. 
Colorado Colorado Rev. Stat. §19-4-106 relates to parentage issues. The law clarifies the status of eggs, 
spermatoza, or embryos in case of marriage dissolution. In addition, the law states that the 
consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual in a 
record at any time before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos.  The law also clarifies that if a 
spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent 
of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted 
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child.  
Connecticut Connecticut General Statutes §19a- 32d to 32g requires a healthcare provider delivering 
fertility treatment to provide information to patients about disposition of embryonic stem cells 
or embryos after treatment. Patients must be given the option to donate embryos to research, 
donate embryos to another couple, store embryos, or otherwise dispose of embryos or 
embryonic stem cells. Written consent to donate embryos, embryonic stem cells, eggs or sperm 
to research is required. 
Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. §742.14-742.17 requires written agreement that provides for the disposition of a 
couple’s eggs, sperm, and pre-embryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any 
other unforeseen circumstance. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. §63.212 relates to pre-planned adoption agreements, which includes the use of 
‘fertility techniques’, which are defined as artificial embryonation, artificial insemination, 
whether in vivo or in vitro, egg donation, or embryo adoption.  
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Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:391.1 declares that any child conceived after the death of a decedent, 
who specifically authorized in writing his surviving spouse to use his gametes, shall be deemed 
the legitimate child of such decedent, provided that the child was born to the surviving spouse, 
using the gametes of the decedent, within 2 years of the death of the decedent. Any heir of the 
decedent whose interest in the succession of the decedent will be reduced by the birth of a 
child conceived shall have 1 year from the birth of such child within which to bring an action 
to disavow paternity. 
 
La. Rev. Stat.  Ann. §9:126  states that an in-vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human 
being that is not the property of the physician; the physician acts as an agent of fertilization, 
the facility which employs him, or the donors of the sperm and ovum. If the IVF patients 
express their identity, then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana Civil Code 
will be preserved. If the IVF patients fail to express their identity, then the physician shall be 
deemed to be temporary guardian of the in-vitro fertilized human ovum until adoptive 
implantation can occur. A court in the parish where the in-vitro fertilized ovum is located may 
appoint a curator, upon motion of the IVF patients, their heirs, or physicians who caused IVF 
to be performed, to protect the in-vitro fertilized human ovum's rights.  
 
La. Rev. Stat.  Ann. §9:130 An in-vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person that cannot 
be owned by the patients undergoing IVF who owe it a high duty of care and prudent 
administration. If the IVF patients renounce, by notarial act, their parental rights for in-utero 
implantation, then the in-vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for adoptive 
implantation in accordance with written procedures of the facility where it is housed or stored. 
The IVF patients may renounce their parental rights in favour of another married couple, but 
only if the other couple is willing and able to receive the in-vitro fertilized ovum. No 
compensation shall be paid or received by either couple to renounce parental rights. 
Constructive fulfilment of the statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall occur when a 
married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the in-vitro fertilized ovum and birth 
occurs.  
 
La. Rev. Stat.  Ann. §9:133 Inheritance rights will not flow to the in-vitro fertilized ovum as a 
juridical person, unless the in-vitro fertilized ovum develops into an unborn child that is born 
in a live birth, or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with 
law. As a juridical person, the embryo or child born as a result of IVF and in-vitro fertilized 
ovum donation to another couple does not retain its inheritance rights from the IVF patients.  
Maryland Md. Ann. Code art. 70, §83A, s 5-2B-10 Provides individuals with information on embryo 
adoption.  
 
Md. Ann. Code Business and Economic Development §5-2B-10 requires healthcare providers 
delivering fertility treatment to provide patients with the option to store, discard, donate 
embryos to research, donate embryos for adoption, or donate embryos to the fertility clinic for 
clinical purposes. Written consent is required for donation to research, and unused oocytes 
(eggs) may not be donated to state-funded research.  
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 111L  states that a physician who provides a patient with IVF 
treatment must provide the patient with information sufficient to allow that patient to make an 
informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of any pre-implantation embryos or 
gametes remaining following the treatment. The physician must present the patient with the 
options of storing, donating to another person, donating for research purposes, or otherwise 
disposing of, or destroying, any unused pre-implantation embryos.  
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. §26:2 Z-2   A person shall be presented with the option of storing any unused 
embryos, donating them to another person, donating the remaining embryos for research 
purposes, or other means of disposition.  
New York 10 NYCRR 52-8.7 Embryos shall not be created for donation by fertilizing donor oocytes with 
donor semen, except at the request of a specific patient who intends to use such embryos for 
her own treatment. Embryos shall not be created using semen or oocytes of client-depositors or 
directed donors who are blood relatives of the other gamete provider to a degree that their 
sexual contact would constitute incest under New York State law. 
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10 NYCRR 52-8.8 (a) Reproductive tissue banks shall obtain written informed consent from 
the donor for participation in the donation program, after the director or a designee has 
provided information to the donor on the procedures for collection, storage and use of semen, 
oocytes or embryos, and the risks of any drugs, surgical procedures, or anaesthesia 
administered.  The rules include criteria for informed consent.  
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code §14-20-64 Defines the effect of dissolution of marriage or withdrawal of 
consent regarding embryo donation. 
N.D. Cent. Code §14-18-03; 14-18-07 clarifies legal parentage of a child conceived after 
invalidity or annulment of marriage or death of spouse. 
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3111.97   Defines parental rights in embryo donation and adoption.  
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §554  Any child or children born as a result of a heterologous oocyte 
donation shall be considered for all legal intents and purposes, the same as a naturally 
conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife which consent to and receive an oocyte 
pursuant to the use of the technique of heterologous oocyte donation. 
 
Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §555  An oocyte donor shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect 
to a child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation from such donor. A child born as a 
result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect 
to the person who donated the oocyte, which resulted in the birth of the child. 
 
Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §556 authorizes human embryo donations and transfers. The law requires 
certain techniques to be used by physicians. It requires written consents and confidentiality. 
This statute relates to children; authorizes human embryo donations and transfers; requires 
performance of certain techniques by physicians; prohibits certain activities; requires written 
consents; specifies certain procedures; requires confidentiality; specifies legal status of certain 
persons; provides that certain donations and transfers are not trafficking in children; specifies 
conditions; provides for codification; and declares an emergency.  
Texas Tex. Family Code Ann. §160.001, et seq. creates the Uniform Parentage Act and describes 
various aspects of determination of maternity and paternity as well as parentage. The law 
requires a man and woman to sign consent to assisted conception. If the father does not sign, 
however, it does not necessarily mean that he is not the legal father. 
Virginia Va. Code §20-158(3)(B) clarifies legal parentage of a child conceived after death of or divorce 
from a spouse. 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code §26.26 creates the Uniform Parentage Act and clarifies legal interpretation of 
parentage of a child of assisted reproduction, including in the event of divorce or death. 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. §14-2-401, et seq. creates the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act. The law defines 
‘assisted reproduction’ and includes intrauterine insemination, donation of eggs, donation of 
embryos, IVF and transfer of embryos, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection in the definition.  
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Table S2: Human cloning laws 
Updated January 2008 
 State Statute citation Summary Prohibits 
reproductive 
cloning 
Prohibits 
therapeutic 
cloning 
Expiration 
 Arizona HB 2221 (2005) Bans the use of public 
monies for 
reproductive or 
therapeutic cloning.  
Prohibits use 
of public 
monies 
Prohibits use 
of public 
monies 
  
Arkansas   
§20-16-1001 to 
1004 
  
Prohibits therapeutic 
and reproductive 
cloning; may not ship, 
transfer or receive the 
product of human 
cloning; human cloning 
is punishable as a Class 
C felony and by a fine 
of not less than 
$250,000 or twice the 
amount of pecuniary 
gain that is received by 
the person or entity, 
whichever is greater. 
Yes Yes   
California Business And 
Professions 
§16004-5 
Health & Safety 
§24185, 
§24187, 
§24189, 
§12115-7 
Prohibits reproductive 
cloning; permits 
cloning for research; 
provides for the 
revocation of licenses 
issued to businesses for 
violations relating to 
human cloning; 
prohibits the purchase 
or sale of ovum, 
zygote, embryo, or 
fetus for the purpose of 
cloning human beings; 
establishes civil 
penalties 
Yes No   
Connecticut 2005 SB 
(Senate Bill) 
934 
Prohibits reproductive 
cloning, permits 
cloning for research; 
punishable by not more 
than $100,000 or 
imprisonment for not 
more than 10 years, or 
both. 
 Yes  No   
Indiana 2005 Senate 
Enrolled Act 
No. 268 
Prohibits reproductive 
and therapeutic 
cloning; allows for the 
revocation of a 
hospital's license 
involved in cloning; 
specifies that public 
funds may not be used 
for cloning; prohibits 
the sale of a human 
 Yes  Yes   
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ovum, zygote, embryo 
or fetus. 
Iowa 707B.1 to 4 Prohibits human 
cloning for any 
purpose; prohibits 
transfer or receipt of a 
cloned human embryo 
for any purpose, or of 
any oocyte, human 
embryo, fetus, or 
human somatic cell, for 
the purpose of human 
cloning; human cloning 
punishable as Class C 
felony; shipping or 
receiving punishable as 
aggravated 
misdemeanour; if 
violation of the law 
results in pecuniary 
gain, then the 
individual is liable for 
twice the amount of 
gross gain; a violation 
is grounds for revoking 
licensure or denying or 
revoking certification 
for a trade or 
occupation. 
Yes Yes   
Maryland 2006 SB 144 Prohibits reproductive 
cloning; prohibits 
donation of oocytes for 
state-funded stem cell 
research but specifies 
that the law should not 
be construed to prohibit 
therapeutic cloning; 
prohibits purchase, 
sale, transfer or 
obtaining unused 
material created for 
IVF that is donated to 
research; prohibits 
giving valuable 
consideration to 
another person to 
encourage the creation 
of IVF materials solely 
for the purpose of 
research; punishable by 
up to 3 years in prison; 
a maximum fine of 
$50,000 or both. 
 Yes  No   
Massachusetts 2005 SB 2039 Prohibits reproductive 
cloning; permits 
cloning for research; 
prohibits a person 
from purchasing, 
selling, transferring, or 
 Yes  No   
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obtaining human 
embryonic, gametic or 
cadaveric tissue for 
reproductive cloning; 
punishable by 
imprisonment in jail or 
correctional facility for 
not less than 5 years or 
more than 10 years or 
by imprisonment in 
state prison for not 
more than 10 years or 
by a fine of up to 1 
million dollars; in 
addition a person who 
performs reproductive 
cloning and derives 
financial profit may be 
ordered to pay profits 
to Commonwealth. 
Michigan §§333.2687-
2688, 
§§333.16274-
16275, 
333.20197, 
333.26401-
26403, 750.430a 
Prohibits human 
cloning for any purpose 
and prohibits the use of 
state funds for human 
cloning; establishes 
civil and criminal 
penalties. 
Yes Yes   
Missouri §1.217 Bans use of state funds 
for human cloning 
research that seeks to 
develop embryos into 
newborn children. 
Prohibits the 
use of state 
funds 
No   
New Jersey §2C:11A-1, 
§26:2Z-2 
Permits cloning for 
research; prohibits 
reproductive cloning, 
which is punishable as 
a crime in the first 
degree; prohibits sale 
or purchase, but not 
donation, or embryonic 
or fetal tissue, which is 
punishable as a crime 
in the third degree and 
a fine of up to $50,000. 
Yes No   
North Dakota §12.1-39 Prohibits reproductive 
and therapeutic 
cloning; transfer or 
receipt of the product 
of human cloning; 
transfer or receipt, in 
whole or in part, any 
oocyte, human embryo, 
human fetus, or human 
somatic cell, for the 
purpose of human 
cloning; cloning or 
attempt to clone 
punishable as a class C 
Yes Yes   
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felony; shipping or 
receiving violations 
punishable as class A 
misdemeanour. 
Rhode Island §23-16.4-1 to 4-
4 
Prohibits human 
cloning for the purpose 
of initiating a 
pregnancy; for a 
corporation, firm, 
clinic, hospital, 
laboratory, or research 
facility, punishable by 
a civil penalty 
punishable by fine of 
not more than 
$1,000,000, or in the 
event of pecuniary 
gain, twice the amount 
of gross gain, 
whichever is greater; 
for an individual or an 
employee of the firm, 
clinic, hospital, 
laboratory, or research 
facility acting without 
the authorization of the 
firm, clinic, hospital, or 
research facility, 
punishable by a civil 
penalty punishable by 
fine of not more than 
$250,000, or in the 
event of pecuniary 
gain, twice the amount 
of gross gain, 
whichever is greater. 
Yes No July 7, 2010 
South Dakota   
§34-14-27 
  
Prohibits reproductive 
and therapeutic 
cloning; transfer or 
receipt of the product 
of human cloning; 
transfer or receipt, in 
whole or in part, any 
oocyte, human embryo, 
human fetus, or human 
somatic cell, for the 
purpose of human 
cloning; cloning or 
attempt to clone is 
punishable as a felony 
and a civil penalty of 
two thousand dollars or 
twice the amount of 
gross gain, or any 
intermediate. 
Yes Yes   
Virginia §32.1-162.32-2 Prohibits reproductive 
cloning; may prohibit 
therapeutic cloning but 
it is unclear because 
Yes Unclear   
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human being is not 
defined in the 
definition of human 
cloning; human cloning 
defined as the creation 
of, or attempt to, create 
a human being by 
transferring the nucleus 
from a human cell from 
whatever source into an 
oocyte from which the 
nucleus has been 
removed; also prohibits 
the implantation or 
attempted implantation 
of the product of 
somatic cell nuclear 
transfer into an uterine 
environment so as to 
initiate a pregnancy; 
the possession of the 
product of human 
cloning; and the 
shipping or receiving 
of the product of a 
somatic cell nuclear 
transfer in commerce 
for the purpose of 
implantation of such 
product into an uterine 
environment so as to 
initiate a pregnancy. 
The law establishes 
civil penalty not to 
exceed $50,000 for 
each incident. 
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Table S3: Stem cell research 
 
Updated January 2008 
  
 
State/Jurisdiction 
Statute Section 
 
Specifically 
permits research on 
the fetus or embryo 
 
Restricts research on 
the aborted fetus or  
embryo 
 
Consent provisions to 
conduct research on 
thefetus or embryo 
Restricts research on the 
fetus or embryo resulting 
from sources other than 
abortion 
 
Restrictions of purchase or 
sale of human tissue for 
research 
Arizona 
§§36-2302, 2303 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on aborted 
living/non-living 
embryo or fetus. 
No Yes, prohibits the use of 
public monies for cloning for 
research. 
No 
Arkansas 
§§20-17-802, 20-16-1001 to 
1004 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on an 
aborted live fetus. 
Yes, consent to conduct 
research on an aborted 
fetus born dead. 
Yes, prohibits research on 
cloned embryos. 
Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
or fetal tissue. 
California Health and Safety 
2004 Proposition 71 §§123440, 
24185, 12115-7, 125300-320 
Yes, permits research 
on adult and 
embryonic stem cells 
from any source. 
Yes, prohibits 
research on an 
aborted live fetus. 
Yes, consent to donate 
IVF embryo to research. 
Prohibits sale of embryos and 
oocytes; prohibits payment in 
excess of the amount of 
reimbursement of expenses to 
be made to any research 
subject to 
encourage her to produce 
human oocytes for the 
purposes of medical research. 
Yes, prohibits sale for the 
purpose of reproductive 
cloning or for stem cell 
research. 
Connecticut §§4-28e; 19a-32d et 
seq. 
Yes, on embryos 
before gastrulation (a 
process during 
embryonic 
development). 
 No Yes, consent to donate 
IVF embryo to research. 
 No Yes, prohibits payment for 
embryos, embryonic stem 
cells unfertilized eggs or 
sperm donated 
following IVF treatment.. 
Florida 
§390.0111 
No Yes, prohibits on 
aborted live fetus. 
No No No 
Illinois 
720 ILCS 510/6, 510/12.1 
Executive Order 6 (2005);410 
ILCS 110/1 et seq. 
Yes, permits research 
on embryonic stem 
cells, embryonic germ 
cells and adult stem 
cells from any source. 
Yes, prohibits 
research on aborted 
living and  
non-living fetus. 
Yes, written consent to 
perform research on cells 
or tissues from a dead 
fetus other than from an 
abortion. 
Yes, prohibits research on the 
fetus or fertilized embryo; 
prohibits funding under E.O. 
6 (2005) of research on 
fetuses from induced 
abortions and the creation 
of embryos through the 
combination of gametes 
Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
and fetal tissue; prohibits 
purchase or sale of 
embryonic or fetal 
cadaveric tissue for 
research but permits 
reimbursement for 
removal, storage and 
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solely for the purpose of 
research. 
transportation for research. 
Indiana 
§35-46-5-1, 16-18-2-5.5 
Yes, permits fetal stem 
cell research on 
placenta, cord blood, 
amniotic fluid or fetal 
tissue. 
Yes, prohibits 
research on aborted 
living and non-living 
embryo or fetus. 
Yes, consent required for 
fetal stem cell research. 
Yes, prohibits research on 
cloned embryos. 
Yes, prohibits sale of 
human ovum, zygote, 
embryo or fetus. 
Iowa 
§§707C.4 
Yes, ensures that Iowa 
patients have access to 
stem cell therapies and 
cures;  Iowa 
researchers may 
conduct stem cell 
research. 
No No No Yes, prohibits transfer or 
receipt of the product of 
human reproductive 
cloning. 
Kentucky 
§436.026 
No No No No Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
and fetal tissue. 
Louisiana 
§14: 87.2 
No No No Yes, prohibits research on 
the fetus, embryo in utero, 
and in-vitro fertilized 
embryo. 
No 
Maine 
22§1593 
No No No Yes, prohibits research on 
fetus or embryo born or 
extracted alive; only applies 
to in-vitro fertilized embryos 
after implantation. 
Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
and fetal tissue. 
Maryland 
83A§5-2B-01 et seq. 
Yes, permits research 
on adult and 
embryonic stem cells. 
 No Yes, written consent to 
donate unused 
IVF material to research. 
Yes, prohibits donation of 
unused oocytes for state-
funded stem cell research; 
cloning of an organism 
beyond the embryonic stage 
is prohibited. 
Yes, prohibits valuable 
consideration for the 
donation or production of 
IVF material. 
Massachusetts 
112§12J, 2005 SB 2039 
Yes, on embryos that 
have not experienced 
more than 14 days of 
development (not 
including days frozen). 
Yes, prohibits 
research on embryo 
and live fetus. 
Yes, written consent to 
perform research on a 
dead fetus and informed 
consent to donate egg, 
sperm, or unused 
preimplantation embryos 
created for IVF. 
Yes, prohibits research 
on live embryo or fetus; also 
prohibits creation of fertilized 
embryo solely for research. 
Yes, prohibits sale of 
neonate, embryo or fetus 
for illegal purposes; 
prohibits sale of embryos, 
gametes or cadaveric 
tissue for research. 
Michigan No Yes, live embryo/ Yes, written consent of Yes, prohibits research on a No 
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§§333.2687-2688, §§333.16274-
16275, 333.20197, 333.26401-
26403, 750.430a 
fetus mother to donate dead 
embryo, fetus or neonate 
to research. 
live 
embryo or fetus, or cloned 
embryo. 
Minnesota 
§§145.421, 422 
No No No Yes, prohibits research on a 
live embryo or fetus up to 
265 days after fertilization. 
Yes, permits the sale and 
purchase of cell culture 
lines from non-living 
human conceptus. 
Missouri 
§§188.036, 037 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a fetus 
alive before abortion. 
No No Yes, prohibits receipt of 
valuable consideration for 
aborted fetal organs or 
tissue. 
Montana 
§50-20-108(3) 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a live 
fetus. 
No No No 
Nebraska 
§§28-342, 346, 71-7606 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on aborted 
live fetus or the use 
of state funds for 
research on fetal 
tissue obtained from 
an abortion. 
No Yes, limits the use of state 
funds for embryonic stem cell 
research; restrictions only 
apply to state healthcare cash 
funds provided by tobacco 
settlement dollars. 
Yes, prohibits sale, 
distribution or donation of 
viable aborted child. 
New Hampshire 
§§168-B:1, 15  
No No No Yes, prohibits the 
maintenance of a unfrozen 
fertilized pre-embryo past 14 
days. 
Yes 
New Jersey 
C.26:2Z-1 et seq.; C.2C:11A-1 
Yes No Yes No No 
New Mexico 
§24-9A-1, 3, 5 
No No No Yes, prohibits research on a 
fetus or embryo born or 
extracted alive, only applies 
to in-vitro fertilized embryos 
after implantation. 
Yes, prohibits abortion for 
the purpose of selling the 
fetus to researchers. 
New York  
Public Health Law Article 2, 
Title 5A 
Yes, permits research 
on adult and 
embryonic stem cells 
from any source. 
No No     
North Dakota 
§14-02.2-01, 2; 2003 HB 1424 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a living 
or non-living embryo 
Yes, requires consent to 
conduct research on a 
non-living fetus or 
Yes, prohibits research on a 
fetus born or extracted alive; 
cloned embryos. 
Yes, prohibits the sale of a 
fetus to be used for illegal 
purposes. 
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or fetus. embryo other than from 
an abortion. 
Ohio 
§2919.14 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a 
living/non-living 
embryo or fetus. 
No No Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
or fetal remains from an 
abortion. 
Oklahoma 
63 §1-735 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a 
fetus/embryo 
No No Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
or fetal remains. 
Pennsylvania 
18 §§3203, 3216 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a live 
embryo or fetus. 
Consideration may not be 
given to mothers 
consenting to research; in 
cases involving abortion, 
consent must be provided 
after decision to abort. 
No Yes, consideration may 
not be given to mothers 
consenting to research or 
other transferring tissue 
except for expenses 
involved in actual retrieval 
and , storage, etc. 
Rhode Island 
§11-54-1 
No No Yes Yes, prohibits research on a 
fetus or embryo born or 
extracted alive; only applies 
to in-vitro fertilized embryos 
after implantation. 
Yes, prohibits sale of 
neonate, embryo or fetus 
for illegal purposes. 
South Dakota 
§§34-14-16, 17, 20; 34-23A-17 
No Yes, prohibits 
research on a living 
or non-living embryo 
or fetus. 
No Yes, prohibits research on an 
embryo outside of a woman's 
body; research on cells or 
tissues derived from an 
embryo outside a woman's 
body. 
Yes, prohibits sale of 
embryo. 
Tennessee 
§39-15-208 
No No Yes, consent required to 
conduct research on an 
aborted fetus. 
No Yes, prohibits sale of 
aborted fetus. 
Texas Penal 
Code §48.02 
No No No No Prohibits sale of fetus and 
fetal tissue. 
Utah 
§§76-7-301, 310 
No No No Yes, prohibits research on a 
live fetus, fertilized embryo 
after implantation. 
Yes, prohibits sale of fetus 
or fetal tissue; also 
prohibits sale of live 
unborn children, which is 
not defined, but are 
referred to in abortion 
statute.  
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Virginia 
§32.1-162.32-2 
No No No May prohibit research on a 
cloned embryo or fetus. 
Yes, prohibits shipping or 
receiving of the product of 
human cloning for 
commerce.  
Wyoming 
§35-6-115 
No No No No Yes, prohibits sale, 
distribution or donation of 
live or viable aborted 
child, defined to include 
embryos, for 
experimentation. 
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Table S4: State laws related to insurance coverage for infertility treatment  
 
Updated June 2014 
 
Since the 1980s, 15 states—Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia—have 
passed laws that require insurers to either cover or offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and 
treatment. Thirteen states have laws that require insurance companies to cover infertility 
treatment.  Louisiana and New York prohibit the exclusion of coverage for a medical condition otherwise 
covered solely because the condition results in infertility.  Two states—California and Texas—have laws that 
require insurance companies to offer coverage for infertility treatment. Utah requires insurers providing 
coverage for maternity benefits to also provide an indemnity benefit for adoption or infertility treatments. While 
most states with laws requiring insurance companies to offer or provide coverage for infertility treatment 
include coverage for in vitro fertilization, California, Louisiana, and New York have laws that specifically 
exclude coverage for the procedure. 
State Summary of Statutes 
Alabama   
Alaska   
American Samoa   
Arizona   
Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. § 23-79-510 specifies that the Arkansas Comprehensive Health 
Insurance Pool shall not include coverage for any expense or charge for in vitro 
fertilization, artificial insemination or any other artificial means used to cause pregnancy. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 23-85-137 and § 23-86-118 (1987, 2011) require accident and health 
insurance companies to cover in vitro fertilization. Services and procedures must be 
performed at a facility licensed or certified by the Department of Health and conform to 
the guidelines and minimum standards of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. (2011 SB 213) 
California 
  
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1374.55 and Cal. Insurance Code § 10119.6 require 
specified group health care service plan contracts and health insurance policies to offer 
coverage for the treatment of infertility, except in vitro fertilization. The law requires 
every plan to communicate the availability of coverage to group contractholders. The law 
defines infertility, treatment for infertility and in vitro fertilization. The law clarifies that 
religious employers are not required to offer coverage for forms of treatment that are 
inconsistent with the organization's religious and ethical principles. The law was 
amended by 2013 Cal. Stats., Chap. 644 (AB 460) to specify that treatment of infertility 
shall be offered and, if purchased, provided without discrimination on the basis of age, 
ancestry, color, disability, domestic partner status, gender, gender expression, gender 
identity, genetic information, marital status, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual 
orientation. 
  
Colorado 
  
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-509 and § 38a-536 (1989, 2005) require that health insurance 
organizations provide coverage for medically necessary expenses in the diagnosis and 
treatment of infertility, including in vitro fertilization procedures. Infertility, in this case, 
refers to an otherwise healthy individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception 
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or to sustain a successful pregnancy during a one-year period. Amended in 2005 to 
provide an exemption for coverage that is contrary to the religious beliefs of an employer 
or individual. 
Delaware   
District of Columbia   
Florida   
Georgia   
Guam   
Hawaii Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 431:10A-116.5 and § 432.1-604 (1989, 2003) require all accident 
and health insurance policies that provide pregnancy-related benefits to also include a 
one-time only benefit for outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization 
procedures. In order to qualify for in vitro fertilization procedures, the couple must have 
a history of infertility for at least five years or prove that the infertility is a result of a 
specified medical condition. 
Idaho   
Illinois Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 215, § 5/356m (1991, 1996) requires certain insurance policies that 
provide pregnancy-related benefits to provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of 
infertility. Coverage includes in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lavage, embryo 
transfer, artificial insemination, gamete sperm artificial intrafallopian tube transfer, 
zygote intrafallopian tube transfer and low tubal ovum transfer. Coverage is limited to 
four completed oocyte retrievals, except if a live birth follows a completed oocyte 
retrieval, then two more completed oocyte retrievals are covered. (1996 Ill. Laws, P.A. 
89-669) 
Indiana   
Iowa   
Kansas   
Kentucky   
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:1036 prohibits the exclusion of coverage for the diagnosis and 
treatment of a medical condition otherwise covered by the policy, contract, or plan, solely 
because the condition results in infertility.  The law does not require insurers to cover 
fertility drugs, in vitro fertilization or other assisted reproductive techniques, reversal of a 
tubal litigation, a vasectomy, or any other method of sterilization. (2001 La. Acts, P.A. 
1045) 
Maine   
Maryland Md. Insurance Code Ann. § 15-810 (2000) amends the original 1985 law and prohibits 
certain health insurers that provide pregnancy-related benefits from excluding benefits 
for all outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization procedures performed. The 
law clarifies the conditions under which services must be provided, including a history of 
infertility of at least a 2-year period and infertility associated with one of several listed 
medical conditions. An insurer may limit coverage to three in vitro fertilization attempts 
per live birth, not to exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,000. The law clarifies 
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that an insurer or employer may exclude the coverage if it conflicts with the religious 
beliefs and practices of a religious organization, on request of the religious 
organization.  Regulations that became effective in 1994 exempt businesses with 50 or 
fewer employees from having to provide the IVF coverage. (2000 Md. Laws, Chap. 283; 
H.B. 350) 
Md. Health General Code Ann. § 19-701 (2000) includes family planning or infertility 
services in the definition of health care services.  
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 47H, ch. 176A, § 8K, ch. 176B, § 4J, ch. 176G, § 4 
and 211 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 37.00 (1987, 2010) require general 
insurance policies, non-profit hospital service corporations, medical service corporations 
and health maintenance organizations that provide pregnancy-related benefits to also 
provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including in vitro 
fertilization. This law was amended in 2010 to change the definition of  "infertility" to be 
a condition of an individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a 
period of one year if the female is under the age of 35, or during a period of six months if 
the female is over the age of 35. If a person conceives but cannot carry that pregnancy to 
live birth, the period of time she attempted to conceive prior to achieving that pregnancy 
shall be included in the calculation of the one year or six month period. (SB 2585) 
Michigan   
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.0625 specifies that medical assistance shall not provide 
coverage for fertility drugs when specifically used to enhance fertility. 
Mississippi   
Missouri   
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 33-22-1521 (1987) revises certain requirements of Montana's 
Comprehensive Health Association, the state's high-risk pool, and clarifies that covered 
expenses do not include charges for artificial insemination or treatment for infertility. (SB 
310) 
Mont. Code Ann. § 33-31-102 et seq. (1987) requires health maintenance organizations 
to provide basic health services on a prepaid basis, which include infertility services. 
Other insurers are exempt from having to provide the coverage. 
Nebraska   
Nevada   
New Hampshire   
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:48-6x, § 17:48A-7w, § 17:48E-35.22 and § 17B:27-46.1x (2001) 
require health insurers to provide coverage for medically necessary expenses incurred in 
diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including medications, surgery, in vitro 
fertilization, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian transfer, 
zygote intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection and four completed egg 
retrievals per lifetime of the covered person. The law includes some restrictions as well 
as a religious exemption for employers that provide health coverage to fewer than 50 
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employees. (SB 1076) 
New Mexico   
New York N.Y. Insurance Law § 3216 (13), § 3221 (6) and § 4303(1990, 2002, 2011) prohibit 
individual and group health insurance policies from excluding coverage for hospital care, 
surgical care and medical care for diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical 
conditions otherwise covered by the policy solely because the medical condition results 
in infertility. The laws were amended in 2002 to require certain insurers to cover 
infertility treatment for women between the ages of 21 and 44 years. The laws exclude 
coverage for in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian tube transfers and zygote 
intrafallopian tube transfers. The laws were amended again in 2011 by N.Y. laws, Chap. 
598 to require every policy that provides coverage for prescription fertility drugs and 
requires or permits prescription drugs to be purchased through a network participating 
mail order or other non-retail pharmacy to provide the same coverage for prescription 
fertility drugs that are purchased from a network participating non-mail order retail 
pharmacy provided that the network participating non-mail order retail pharmacy agrees 
in advance to the same reimbursement amount and the same terms and conditions that the 
insurer has established for a network participating mail order or other non-retail 
pharmacy.  The policy is prohibited from imposing additional fees, co-payments, co-
insurance, deductibles or other conditions on any insured person who elects to purchase 
prescription fertility drugs through a non-mail order retail pharmacy. (2011 AB 8900) 
 
N.Y. Public Health Law § 2807-v (2002) creates a grant program to improve access to 
infertility services, treatments and procedures from the tobacco control and insurance 
initiatives pool. 
North Carolina   
North Dakota   
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (1991) requires health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) to provide basic health care services, which are defined to include 
infertility services, when medically necessary. 
Oklahoma   
Oregon   
Pennsylvania   
Puerto Rico   
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-18-30, § 27-19-23, § 27-20-20 and § 27-41-33 (1989, 2007)require 
any contract, plan or policy of health insurance (individual and group), nonprofit hospital 
service, nonprofit medical service and health maintenance organization to provide 
coverage for medically necessary expenses for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. 
The law clarifies that the co-payments for infertility services not exceed 20 percent. 
Infertility is defined as the condition of an otherwise healthy married individual who is 
unable to conceive or produce conception during a period of one year.  Rhode Island 
includes IVF coverage.  Amended in 2007 to increase the age of coverage for infertility 
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from forty (40) to forty-two (42) and redefines infertility to mean a woman who is unable 
to sustain pregnancy during a period of one year. (2007 R.I. Pub. Laws, Chap. 411, SB 
453) 
South Carolina   
South Dakota   
Tennessee   
Texas Tex. Insurance Code Ann. § 1366.001 et seq. (1987, 2003) requires that all health 
insurers offer and make available coverage for services and benefits for expenses 
incurred or prepaid for outpatient expenses that may arise from in vitro fertilization 
procedures. In order to qualify for in vitro fertilization services, the couple must have a 
history of infertility for at least five years or have specified medical conditions resulting 
in infertility.  The law includes exemptions for religious employers. 
U.S. Virgin Islands   
Utah 2014 Utah Laws, Chap. 353 (HB 347) amended § 31A-22-610.1, which requires 
insurers that provide coverage for maternity benefits to also provide an adoption 
indemnity benefit of $4,000 for a child placed for adoption with the insured within 90 
days of the child’s birth. The law was amended to allow an enrollee to obtain infertility 
treatments rather than seek reimbursement for an adoption. If the policy offers optional 
maternity benefits, then it must also offer coverage for these indemnity benefits under 
certain circumstances. 
Vermont   
Virginia   
Washington   
West Virginia W. Va. Code § 33-25A-2 (1995) amends the 1997 law and requires health insurers 
to cover basic health care services, which include infertility services.  Applies to health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) only. 
Wisconsin   
Wyoming 
  
 
 
Note: List may not be comprehensive, but is representative of state laws that exist. NCSL appreciates additions 
and corrections. 
 
 
